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QUESTION  & ANSWER  WITH
PROFESSORS ELLIOTT,
STRAUSS,  AND  SUNSTEIN
KEY:
DP  =  Dick Pierce, Moderatort
DE  =  Donald Elliott*
PS  =  Peter Strauss**
CS  =  Cass Sunstein***
DP:  Before you get your chance at questions, Peter said enough to pro-
voke a request  from Cass  Sunstein  for three minutes  of rebuttal  time,
which I have granted.
CS:  I  was  uncharacteristically  cautious,  wasn't  I?  The  three  major
cases that divide contemporary ideas about administrative law have to be
Chevron,  1 State Farm,  2 and Heckler v. Chaney,  3 right?  Chevron on def-
erence  to  agency  determinations  of law, State Farm on the hard  look
doctrine, Heckler v. Chaney against  agency inaction.  I think Chevron's
analysis was badly off, State Farm was basically right, and I think Heck-
ler v. Chaney points in the wrong direction in drawing this sharp distinc-
tion between action and inaction.  In understanding why I think that, I
think Peter is exactly right in pointing to the systemic ex ante effects of
judicial  review.
Most of the real world is affected by these three cases not because of
"bubbles"  and passive restraints and drugs being injected  and people are
going to be executed  as a result-those are important,  yes, but adminis-
trative  law now is  done day to day  in the shadow of these three  cases.
That's the systemic ex ante effect and that is huge.  Now, Don's data are
extremely interesting and important.  When thinking about the impact of
judicial review, one wants to think also about the systemic ex ante effect.
t  George W. Hutchinson  Professor of Law,  Southern Methodist University.  B.S.  1965,  Le-
high University;  J.D.  1972,  University of Virginia.
*  Professor of Law,  Yale Law School.
**  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University  School of Law.
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One need look no further than the Mashaw and Melnick studies, 4 which
showed that the allocation of authority internal to the agency is dramati-
cally affected  by judicial determinations  of this sort.  In the OSHA and
EPA cases,  the most important thing is not whether the remand  comes
up the same  way next time;  it's that it has a  ripple  effect  on  what the
agency  does  every  day afterwards.  The  decision  will  still be  political;
most of these cases  will never get to court, but their political character
will be affected  very dramatically by the  existence of the previous case.
The  OSHA  decision in  Benzene 5  had  effect  not  only  on  what  OSHA
does, but on what the EPA does  and on what the FDA does.  A lot of
federal regulatory policy is affected by this case, and it has nothing to do
with  ex post litigation at all.  I think in that respect, Peter hasn't taken
far enough his initial correct insight about the systemic  effect of judicial
review.
Now, one wants to ask, is this a good systemic  effect or a bad one?
That's a complicated issue.  The two things one wants to think about are
legality and the real world.  There is  a lot to be said for the claim that
both  legality  and the real world  are  made better,  are better served,  by
aggressive judicial review of administrative action.
One very quick way to make this point is to look at what's happened
under  President  Reagan's  Executive  Order  No.  12,291.6  That  is  not
quite a substitution of political controls for legal controls; that's comple-
mentary and not exclusive.  The Executive  Order is done in the shadow
of the hard look doctrine.  You can't read the annual regulatory program
of the President without seeing the omnipresence of both legality require-
ments and rationality requirements.  If you talk to anyone involved early
on or today in the OMB process, their eyes are on the statute books and
on rationality, and that owes a whole lot to the hard look doctrine and to
what preceded  Chevron.  The  reason I have enthusiasm  for State Farm
and skepticism about Chevron is because what those cases,  if rightly de-
cided, will do, is to ensure that you get the analysis first and the conclu-
sion second, rather than vice-versa.  My fear is that the abandonment  of
aggressive judicial review-the continuation of Chevron, which says that
those limited by authority judge the scope of the limitation, an idea ex-
traordinarily foreign to our traditions-and abandonment of State Farm,
the consequence of those things simultaneously will be to permit conclu-
4.  Mashaw  & Harfst,  Regulation and Legal Culture:  The  Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
YALE  J.  ON REG.  257 (1987);  R. MELNICK,  REGULATION  AND  THE COURTS:  TmE  CASE  OF THE
CLEAN  AIR AcT 379-83  (1983).
5.  Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO  v. American  Petroleum  Inst., 448  U.S.  607 (1980).
6.  Exec.  Order No.  12,291,  44 C.F.R.  1 (1988),  reprinted in 5 U.S.C.  §  601  (1982).
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sion first and analysis second,  which serves neither legality  nor the real
world very well.
DE:  I like  Chevron,  I don't like State Farm, and  I tend not to like
Heckler.  I think the key difference  between Cass and me in this area is
that I tend to incline more toward Peter's view of preferring alternatives
to courts as reviewing institutions.  I don't think the executive order pro-
cess exhausts the potential creativity  for devising a lot of other  alterna-
tives to court to perform some of these functions.  But I would take issue
with the assertion that we know that the effects of judicial review on the
administrative process and on the internal deliberations  within agencies
are huge.  I know about some of these articles that give Bill Pedersen's 7
and  Shep  Melnick's8  and  I  think  to  a  lesser  extent  Jerry  Mashaw's 9
view-I think I read Mashaw's study very differently, Cass.  I see [it]  as
being essentially  a political  process that drives that shift,  in which the
courts and the visibility that courts bring to particular proceedings play a
role, but I think it's a misreading of what's really going on in both Mel-
nick's and Mashaw's work to suggest that the courts are producing this
effect.  I think it's much more of a total political  context within which
the regulatory action is taking place.
PS:  I agree with a good deal of what Cass Sunstein has said, but want
to call attention to an unstated premise in his analysis.  To the extent his
argument was  that legality and the courts  are particularly  important in
keeping the President's  political controls  under control, I would  agree.
He and I, as you may know, cooperated in the past on a study aimed in
that direction. 1 0  But keeping the President an honest political broker is a
different proposition from taking over supervision  of political outcomes
at the agency level, and that's where I tend to be cautious.  In part this is
because if we are going to be candid we have to measure our ideal of an
apolitical judiciary against the reality of some politicization.  One of the
realities that you'll find in Dick Pierce's analysis in the Duke Law Jour-
nal  1  is  that the D.C. Circuit opinions  are not only activist,  and thus
dismissive  of agency  outcomes, but  also very  readily  explained  on the
basis of politics.  They are sharply divided along political lines.  From the
very outset, when the great Chief Justice outlived his party for more than
three decades, we have known that judges may be only our longest lived
7.  Pedersen, Formal  Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE  L.J. 38  (1975).
8.  See  S.  MELNICK, supra note 4.
9.  See J. MASHAW, supra note 4.
10.  Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal  Rulemaking, 38 AD-
MIN.  L.  REv.  181  (1986).
11.  Pierce,  Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political  Polarity on the District of Columbia
Circuit and Judicial  Deterrence of  Agency Rulemaking,  1988  DUKE L.J. 300,  303-13.
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and  least  responsible  politicians.  One  of the  situations  that  faces  the
country  today and may be endemic for our future is that we have a Re-
publican presidency and a Republican judiciary lined up against a Demo-
cratic  Congress.  That  may  suggest  that  legality  is  too  simple  an
expression for understanding judicial behavior.  Might one argue, for ex-
ample, that an  allegiance between  President and judiciary against  Con-
gress  provides  some  means for understanding  the judiciary's  increasing
taste for plain meaning approaches to statutory interpretation?12  To the
extent  that  we imagine judicial  review  as  delivering  political  services,
rather  than defending  individual rights, judges'  political characteristics
biecome  perhaps especially  problematic.  Judicial  perpetuation  of values
that the people are  free  to choose  and  have left behind  has  again  and
again  been a source  of difficulty for the courts.  It is, in this context,  a
source of concern about hard look.
The other thing that might be said about State Farm is simply that,
given the underlying politics, that particular holding may in fact repre-
sent  the courts  checking  the  President  as  much  as  it  does  the  courts
checking the agency.
DP [to the audience]:  Now you get your chance.
QUESTION:  I have a question for Cass.  I have to, first of all, agree.  I
don't like Heckler; I don't like Chevron; and I like State Farm.  But I
wonder how you can conclude that close judicial scrutiny makes agencies
put analysis first and conclusions  second as opposed to conclusions first
and more careful analysis that supports the conclusions later.
CS:  That's a good question.  The answer is, once you start to analyze a
problem, then you start to think about it differently, often.  This is some-
thing that should be studied empirically, but you can show actually that
it has sometimes  happened.  One example  is the airbags  problem itself.
When  you know,  as  I know personally  because  I was  there,  when  the
Reagan  Administration  came  in, passive  restraints,  anything  having to
do with that was top of the hit list-that is, on a literal hit list-and that
was not  an analyzed  conclusion,  that was  an irrebuttable presumption.
Now,  once the courts  said  "that's  out,"  it didn't happen  that a  better
justification just came up, it was that the problem  was revisited.  I'd be
very interested  in seeing from the Elliott and Schuck study13 how  often
this happens.  What I do  know, is that it happens  sometimes,  and in a
way that really matters.  I believe that something similar happened with
12.  For an example of this approach, see K-Mart  Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,  108 S.  Ct. 1811,  1817
(1988) ("If the agency regulation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute, a reviewing
court must give  deference to the agency's interpretation  of the statute.").
13.  Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical  Study of Federal  Administrative
Law, 1990  DUKE L.J-(forthcoming June,  1990).
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regulation  of lead;  it was  in the  early  days  of the EPA.  There was  a
decision made;  Judge Leventhal  sent it back;  it tuined out there was  a
very elementary  error that was quite arguably  politically  driven, a very
different result eventually came out.  Even if that example is a little off, it
happens enough.  Everyone can probably see it with himself;  it is not the
case that once one is forced to analyze a problem, the conclusion comes
first always;  the fact that you have  to  do the analysis  might make the
conclusion softer or different.
DE:  Just to answer that one question, in the data that I showed there, it
shows that about 35-40%  of the time,  when  a case is  sent  back to an
agency,  the  agency  really  does  reassess  and  make  a  major  change.  I
think that's a good deal more than I expected before  we did the study,
but it leaves the question,  is the glass half empty  or half full?  I think
neither  very simplistic  view that  agencies  never  rethink,  are  never  af-
fected, nor that they always respond to courts, is correct.  It's someplace
in between  in the 35-40%  range, but that's something.  That does pro-
mote a  major reevaluation.  We also looked  for factors  other  than the
judicial review, that might explain the turnaround and they really didn't
exist.  It seems  to be that the second  look-not the hard look but the
second look-does in fact empirically, in a substantial but not a majority
of cases,  promote a real rethinking.
QUESTION:  I'd like to  think that rethinking  is  most  likely  when  a
court  sends  something back  to an  agency  and  says  "You've  gotten  it
wrong."  I'm thinking more in  terms of the systemic ex  ante problem:
knowing  that the judicial review will  occur, will that really change the
conclusion of the agency?
DE:  That's very hard to study.
PS:  In  my  experience,  the answer  is  yes,  but  that's old  and  limited
experience.
QUESTION:  This is addressed  to everybody, but perhaps  particularly
Cass and Peter.  Isn't it the case, or could it be the case, that hard look
and  increased presidential  or political  controls are  consistent,  and that
the latter, political controls,  could be enhanced,  perhaps thereby reduc-
ing the likelihood  of reversals  or the need for hard look?
CS:  Yes.  I am  a  real  enthusiast  for  Executive  Orders  12,29114  and
12,49815.  Peter and I have written  on that together, 16 but I am not an
enthusiast for the abandonment of the hard look doctrine, as a result.  I
14.  Exec.  Order No.  12,291,  44 C.F.R.  1 (1988),  reprinted in 5 U.S.C.  § 601 (1982).
15.  Exec.  Order No.  12,498,  50  Fed. Reg.  1036  (1985).
16.  Strauss & Sunstein,  supra note 9.
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think they fit together beautifully  and they are necessary  correctives  to
the abuses of the other.
PS:  If we can isolate for a  moment the effect  of hard look review  on
internal  agency process from the effect of hard look review on the presi-
dential process,  and I'm not sure that that could be done, then I would
prefer to see that impact on internal agency process disappear, or at least
be subdued in comparison to what results from the presidential  process.
That  is to say, if one has a  President in fact supervising agency  priori-
ties-and it is just that process  that makes  me as enthusiastic  as Cass is
for [Executive  Orders]  12,291  and 12,498-then that aspect of hard look
tends  to make courts ask:  "Did you get this exactly right?"
For example, in the air bags case, the court of appeals, in one of its
early rulings, sends back a complex rulemaking because General Motors
hadn't quite got the dummy's neck right.17  A court is just too prone to
misunderstand the problem  as it was before the agency and to lead to the
kind of flyspecking  that, on my reading of the Mashaw and Harfst study
of NHTSA administration, '8 is indeed a principal part of their account of
regulatory  failure.  So to the extent that one sees  now in place  a pretty
decent presidential process for insisting that agencies have regulatory pri-
orities  and think about how  much they're going to accomplish  through
this regulation rather than that regulation, I'm prepared to see the courts
let go.
QUESTION:  Comment on two of the three panelists.  It seems  to me
that there's a lot of focus  on what the agencies  and the President want
the policies to be at the agency and a bit of a slighting of what Congress
wanted the policies to be.  I was at the EPA during all the early  1970s,
and was a colleague of Bill Pedersen  and my experience was that it was
cases such as  the Kennecott case' 9 in  1972  that  allowed lawyers  in the
EPA General Counsel's office  to bring some element of Congress's legal
controls .to bear and time after  time, what  we saw when  the packages
came up from the program offices of the EPA was shoddy work, reflect-
ing more of the attitude of the EPA engineers of what they wanted to do,
and  relatively  little  attention  to rational-by  "rational,"  I  mean  even
good  math-rulemaking,  and  certainly  no  attention  to  legal  require-
ments.  And it was Kennecott that gave us and a few  other lawyers  the
ability to send the package back and say "We can't defend this.  At least
do it right and correct the math while you're at it."
17.  Chrysler  Corp.  v. Department  of Transp., 472 F.2d  659 (6th  Cir. 1972).
18.  Mashaw  & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor  Vehicle Safety, 4
YALE J. ON REG.  257 (1987).
19.  Kennecott  Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846  (D.C.  Cir. 1972).
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CS:  This is why I think that what I see  as the conventional  separation
of powers analysis of Chevron is off.  Chevron sees the opposition between
court and agency and says that one ought to favor the agency because it's
accountable.  In a case in which the question is the meaning  of a statu-
tory term, I think you rightly point out that it is not court vs. agency, but
Congress  vs.  agency,  and  this  is why  a certain  form  of the hard  look
doctrine can be a great friend of legality,  and of, I think, ordinary  con-
ceptions of the separation of powers.
DE:  Well, I think the effect that you describe at EPA of strengthening
the hand of the lawyers as opposed to the engineers or the programmatic
people is probably in fact one of the effects that aggressive judicial review
has.  I wish I could find something to disagree with Peter Strauss about,
because I normally like to disagree  with Peter.
It's probably  helpful that in my experience  in the early  period,  in
1972, at EPA, I'm not at all convinced that environmental laws that are
designed  and run primarily by lawyers  are a good  thing.  And I think
that the over-judicialization of the regulatory process and the dominance
of lawyers in policymaking positions within agencies, EPA in particular,
is  probably an illustration of the kind of thing that we would be better
without, at least in the second generation.  Picking up on the point about
how these things change over time, maybe we needed some legalism  in
the early 1970s, but I think maybe now it's a different time, it's a different
enterprise for the regulatory state and maybe there needs to be a change.
PS:  If I can make what I think is the same point in a slightly different
way, you did not face  12,291,  and the kind of aggressive OMB  oversight
of agency fact-thinking  processes that now occurs.  Hal Bruff, sitting in
the front row, has just published for the Administrative  Conference a fine
study  of that  subject that will  appear  in  George Washington Law Re-
view 20 soon.  You should all read it; it is very much along the lines we've
been talking about-that is, it recognizes  the need for more controls of
the President's control of the process.  But I think one needs to go back
to Kennecott and reexamine  it in terms  that now  recognize  significant
political  controls by the President and structural  controls by the Presi-
dent.  In  some ways this is why I like Sierra Club v. Costle  21  so much,
and in part why I like Chevron: Chevron recognizes that courts  are not
alone  in  the  business.  The other  reason  why  I like Chevron,  and I've
written at some length about this22 so I think I can say it very briefly, is
20.  Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency  Rulemaking, 57  GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV.  533
(1989).
21.  657  F.2d 298  (D.C. Cir.  1981).
22.  Strauss, One Hundred-fifty Cases  Per Year:  Some Implications  of the Supreme Court's Lim-
ited Resources for Judicial  Review of Agency Action,  87 COLUM.  L. REV.  1093  (1987).
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that we still have  only one  Supreme  Court,  and we  have  168  court  of
appeals judges.  If the notion is that any time a court of appeals looks at a
complex  statutory question,  it gets it right and it gets it the  same  way
that all the other court of appeals judges in this country are going to get
it, and it gets it with a full understanding of the agency program and the
way in which its readirig of the statute will impact on that program, that
is not a notion with which I can easily agree.  That's not to say that there
isn't a large  role for the courts to pursue in  enforcing  legality.  At the
very least, at what is described  as  Chevron step  1, the  courts are to ask
what could the statute mean, and step in when the agency action stands
outside  of any  possible  meaning  for  the statute;  and  courts  probably
should  look with the kind of cautionary  regard that Cass also suggests
for those cases in which what the agency is doing is plainly enlarging its
own power.  Nonetheless, a realistic look at what mode of control is go-
ing to produce  cheap  and  effective  government  to the extent  we  want
government here, won't always  choose  the courts.
QUESTION:  If I could make just one  follow-up  about  12,291,  I cer-
tainly don't know how it's working, inside the agencies, because I'm not
there-it may be working rationally, technocratically, perfectly.  But we
did have 3171-...  which extended until the day after the Carter admin-
istration took office on January  21,  1977.  What that involved  was very
strong  OMB  control,  supervision,  bargaining  with  other  agencies,  and
basically, in my opinion, and in the opinion of most people at EPA, was
very much political, it was not at all directed toward improving the per-
formance  [of the agencies]  now  12,291  and all  the other processes  now
are doing all those things, but one has  to wonder if somebody couldn't
press the question whether they are masks for a political process as well.
PS:  Good question.
CS:  When  you  think  of  12,291,  a lot  of it is  excellent.  But keep  in
mind,  this  is  President -Reagan's  regulatory  program,  which  has  very
deeply held  political biases,  some  of which I think  are  great,  some  of
which are not so great.  OMB control  maybe helps  technocracy,  maybe
not.  OMB's focus, I assure you, and I know something about this, is not
first and foremost  on legality.  And to the extent that it's not first and
foremost on legality,  Chevron is no help.
DE:  Well, let me respond to [the question] of how we assess how good
a job the courts are  doing, you know, compared  to  what?  When  Peter
says I wasn't there, that's right as far as the agency is concerned,  but  I
was there  as a law  clerk on the D.C. Circuit in the mid '70s,  when we
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decided cases like the Ethyl23 case and the Vermont Yankee24 case, and I
can tell you that my perception is that the judges and law clerks did not
really  penetrate  deeply into the facts and understand  the consequences.
In that sense I think Shep Melnick's book2s is really quite accurate and
one of the pieces that Peter Schuck and I hope to do as an outgrowth of
this  study  is  to compare  agency  responses  to  remands  from  courts  as
opposed  to  agency  responses  to  the EPA  science advisory  board.  The
working  hypothesis  is that precisely  because  the EPA science  advisory
board, which is composed of a group of outside scientists, can penetrate
more deeply and more credibly into the bad math that the people at the
program  office  do,  that agencies  are much more  likely to respond  in a
real way when that kind of credible reviewing institution questions their
conclusions  than when a court does.
Just one little story about that:  in the Vermont Yankee  case, and in the
Baltimore Gas and Electric case,26  among other things, Judge  Bazelon,
for whom I was working, got the half life of plutonium wrong by a factor
of 10.  Now, this is a quite inessential element  of the case, but you can
imagine this going back to the scientists at the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission and their saying, "This bozo doesn't even know what the half-life
of plutonium  is."  I don't have that data yet, at some point I'd like to
have it, I think that looking at "leave  agencies alone" or have hard look
by courts and lawyers, is to create false oppositions in my view.  I think
that we need to be thinking in the future more creatively  about what the
right type of reviewing institutions  are in various  areas rather than just
pushing  courts,  which  were,  after  all, just  around;  a kind  of bricolage
process  in which  you  take what's  available  and press  it into service  to
perform a new function.  If you sat down to design a reviewing institu-
tion for EPA, the D.C. Circuit is  never what anyone  would design.  It
just happened to be there, and you use it, and so on.
PS:  I was at the NRC at precisely the time when Don was where  he
was.  Perhaps all  I'll  say is that the  impact  of that Court  of Appeals
opinion on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was to subtract, let's say
roughly  10 man-years  of effort from whatever  else the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission was able to  do during the relevant  period- of time.
QUESTION:  [There's one thing that I want to point out.]  You have to
include  Congress's  relationship  with  courts  [which  is]  central  to  the
23.  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d  1 (D.C. Cir.  1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941  (1976).
24.  Vermont Yankee Nuclear  Power Corp. v. Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  547
F.2d 633  (D.C.  Cir. 1976) rev'd, 435  U.S.  519  (1978).
25.  R.  MELNICK, supra note 4.
26.  Natural  Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 685  F.2d 459 (D.C.  1983), rev'd, 462 U.S.  87
(1983).
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courts'  objectives.  Now on to another point of the equation,  I think the
question  to ask is how do you [consider the]  impact of Congress's rela-
tionship  with the  executive branch.  We  now  know  [that]  Congress  is
much more productive today than the executive branch.  The Executive
is behind.  The theory  now in which control  lies [with the Executive].  I
think it would be particularly  useful  to evaluate  the errors of different
courts  and [think]  about the methods that one uses for delegation.
PS:  That's  an  excellent  point,  and  is  reflected  in  the  kind  of thing
you've pointed out to me in private discussions  in the past; that, in fact
the nature of what  Congress is doing today  is often extraordinarily  pre-
cise delineation of what the agencies  are expected to do rather than the
broad  delegations  that may  have  characterized,  say, the  1930s  or even
other periods of time when the presidency and the Congress were in the
same political hands, and whether  that is a product  of what's expected
from the agencies or what's expected from the courts is a nice issue.  But
clearly part of the political control equation, and part of the legal control
equation  has  also  to  look  at  the  Congress  and  the  impact  on  that
relationship.
DP:  We are adjourned.
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